Everyone who has commented on the draft Menendez-Corker resolution to strike Syria has focused on this language:
The President is authorized, subject to subsection (b), to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in a limited and tailored manner against legitimate military targets in Syria, [my emphasis]
The pursuit of a somewhat pregnant war continues!
And while the resolution makes pains to limit our involvement geographically (though John Kerry implied today if Syria’s allies get involved than we’d be able to go after them), it also allows boots on the ground for non-combat functions.
The authority granted in section 2 does not authorize the use of the United States Armed Forces on the ground in Syria for the purpose of combat operations.
And I’m rather interested in this language, which SFRC added from the White House version.
Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution to use force in order to defend the national security interests of the United States:
I’m sure that won’t be abused at all.
Update: Nada Bakos notes that the government will be asked to vet their plans for Syria. But not until halfway through the initial authorization.
Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this resolution, the President shall consult with Congress and submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives an integrated United States Government strategy for achieving a negotiated political settlement to the conflict in Syria, including a comprehensive review of current and planned U.S. diplomatic, political, economic, and military policy towards Syria, including: (1) the provision of all forms of assistance to the Syrian Supreme Military Council and other Syrian entities opposed to the government of Bashar Al-Assad that have been properly and fully vetted and share common values and interests with the United States; (2) the provision of all forms of assistance to the Syrian political opposition, including the Syrian Opposition Coalition; (3) efforts to isolate extremist and terrorist groups in Syria to prevent their influence on the future transitional and permanent Syrian governments; (4) coordination with allies and partners; and (5) efforts to limit support from the Government of Iran and others for the Syrian regime.
